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Abstract
After years of being an information and communication technology laggard relative to other 
developing regions of the world, Africa has been pushed to the forefront in a new information 
revolution, thanks to mobile communications. This period has also witnessed considerable mobility 
in the information and communication technology rankings of different African nations. This article 
examines changes in the information and communication technology rankings of different African 
nations and concludes that, as an analytical framework, the “digital divide” does not accurately 
describe what is happening on the continent and may lead to policy choices that are harmful to 
Africa’s future.
The phenomenal development of mobile communications on the continent of Africa, in particular 
since the turn of the new millennium, is one of the most heartening examples of how information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) can transform economic and social life. After years of 
being an ICT laggard relative to other developing regions of the world, African has been pushed 
– by mobile communications – to the forefront in a new information revolution. Consider these 
soundbytes:
• Africa has added more ICT users in the first few years of the new century than in the 
previous hundred.
• Africa was the first region in the world where the number of mobile users overtook the 
number of fixed lines (in 2001); and by the start of 2004 there were more than twice as 
many mobile users as fixed lines (see Figure 3.1, below, left chart).
• Africa has had the fastest growing mobile sector of any world region over the last five 
years and has the highest percentage of mobile users as a percentage of total telephone 
subscribers (Figure 3.1, below, right chart).
• More than three-quarters of African states now have competition in the mobile market and 
more than 95% of African users enjoy a choice of operator.
Such growth was not predicted. Most forecasts of demand for telecommunications in Africa made 
in the 1990s were based on the assumptions that mobile services were generally priced at a higher 
level than ﬁxed-line services, and that considerable investments would be needed to establish new 
networks, and this would therefore retard their growth. Experience has since shown that, although 
these assumptions may be valid, the strong demand to communicate – using whatever means are 
available – was sufﬁcient to drive the market. 
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect the opinions of ITU or its 
membership. For more information on this topic, and for background data, please see African Telecommunication Indicators 
(ITU, 7th edition, May 2004), www.itu.int/ti.
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This period has also witnessed considerable mobility in the ICT rankings of different African nations. 
Many nations that did well in the 1990s are not doing so well now, while other nations have made 
surprising gains. Again this runs counter to received wisdom.
Much of the current debate concerning the so-called “digital divide” seems to assume that the 
status quo in access to ICTs will continue to exist long into the foreseeable future. This article 
examines changes in the ICT rankings of different African nations and concludes that, as an 
analytical framework, the “digital divide” does not accurately describe what is happening on the 
continent; in fact, it is argued, the “digital divide” may lead to policy choices that are harmful to 
Africaʼs future.
Which indicator to use?
What is the best way of measuring progress in ICTs? Typically, the measure of choice has been 
“teledensity” – or ﬁxed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. However, in the case of Africa, this is not 
particularly meaningful now that mobile telephone users outnumber ﬁxed lines in 44 out of 55 African 
economies at the end of 2003 (see Table 3.1). An alternative would be to measure “mobidensity” 
– mobile telephones per 100 inhabitants, but this would disadvantage those economies, like Egypt 
or Libya, where the ﬁxed-line network is well established, or others, like Eritrea or Ethiopia, where 
the mobile network is still in its infancy.
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Figure 3.1: Africa’s mobile revolution
Mobile telephone users overtaking fixed lines in Africa, 
1993-2003 
Fixed line and mobile penetration, per 100 inhabitants
Source: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database.
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Table 3.1: Effective teledensity (mobile or ﬁxed – whichever is higher) per 100 inhabitants, 
Africa, 1993-2003
               Effective Teledensity
Country 1993 2003 CAGR
Algeria 3.66 6.93 6.6%
Angola 0.49 1.32 10.3%
Benin 0.32 3.36 26.5%
Botswana 2.68 29.71 27.2%
Burkina Faso 0.21 1.85 24.2%
Burundi 0.23 0.90 14.8%
Cameroon 0.45 6.62 30.9%
Cape Verde 3.23 15.63 17.1%
Central African Rep. 0.20 0.97 17.2%
Chad 0.07 0.80 27.4%
Comoros 0.76 1.66 8.1%
Congo 0.76 9.43 28.7%
Congo (DR) 0.09 1.89 35.6%
Cote dʼIviore 0.66 7.43 27.4%
Djibouti 1.32 3.44 10.1%
Egypt 3.66 12.73 13.3%
Equatorial Guinea 0.35 7.64 36.1%
Eritrea 0.39 0.92 8.8%
Ethiopia 0.25 0.63 9.5%
Gabon 2.79 22.44 23.2%
Gambia 1.40 12.71 24.6%
Ghana 0.30 3.56 28.1%
Guinea 0.17 1.44 23.8%
Guinea-Bissau 0.64 0.82 2.6%
Kenya 0.89 5.02 18.9%
Lesotho 0.61 7.26 28.0%
Liberia 0.16 0.21 2.4%
Libya 4.84 13.56 10.9%
Madagascar 0.31 1.71 18.7%
Malawi 0.35 1.29 13.9%
Mali 0.15 2.30 31.4%
Mauritania 0.33 10.90 42.0%
Mauritius 7.35 37.87 17.8%
Mayotte 3.80 21.56 19.0%
Morocco 2.56 24.34 25.3%
Mozambique 0.39 2.28 19.3%
Namibia 4.21 11.63 10.7%
Niger 0.12 0.20 4.6%
Nigeria 0.32 2.55 23.1%
Reunion 29.99 74.74 9.6%
Rwanda 0.20 1.60 22.9%
Sao Tomé e Principe 1.98 4.95 8.8%
Senegal 0.75 5.56 22.1%
Seychelles 14.23 68.18 17.0%
Sierra Leone 0.33 2.75 23.7%
Somalia 0.17 0.54 12.4%
South Africa 9.35 36.36 14.5%
Sudan 0.25 2.70 27.0%
Swaziland 1.78 8.43 16.8%
Tanzania 0.31 2.52 23.2%
Togo 0.41 4.40 26.9%
Tunisia 4.42 19.21 15.8%
Uganda 0.17 3.03 33.1%
Zambia 0.92 2.15 8.8%
Zimbabwe 1.22 3.22 10.2%
Average 1.61 6.77 15.5%
Note: Figures highlighted in bold are those economies where mobile telephone users outnumber fixed lines. CAGR 
= Compound Annual Growth Rate. Italics = estimated data. Source: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators 
Database.
~
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A third possible choice would be to count “total teledensity” – or mobile and ﬁxed lines combined. 
This would provide an impressive level, for both penetration rate and total number of subscribers 
(see Figure 3.2). But, from an analytical point of view, this indicator has limitations because of the 
degree of double counting of individuals or households that possess both a ﬁxed-line telephone 
and a mobile telephone.
Probably the best choice for measuring a countryʼs (and a continentʼs) progress in ICTs is “effective 
teledensity”. This is measured as “ﬁxed lines or mobile users – whichever is higher – per 100 
inhabitants”. This indicator does not suffer from the problems of double-counting and allows for 
comparison between countries that are doing well in both mobile and ﬁxed-line networks as well as 
those that are doing well in one but not the other.
As a side issue here, there is scope for much more research on the topic of cross-ownership of 
mobile and ﬁxed-line telephones. It would be interesting to know, for instance, the percentage 
of families that have either one or the other, the percentage that have both and the percentage 
that have neither. It would also be interesting to know whether the trend is towards greater cross-
ownership or whether the purchase of a mobile telephone is considered to obviate the need for 
a ﬁxed-line telephone. But gathering these types of data requires household census surveys and 
they are, therefore, expensive to collect on a rolling basis. 
1Telkom South Africa
At least six African economies have experienced falls in their levels of ﬁxed lines, of which the most 
dramatic has been South Africa, where the installed base of ﬁxed lines has been falling since 1999. 
The introduction of competition in the ﬁxed-line market may reverse this decline, but the policy 
failings of extending Telkom SAʼs1 period of exclusivity are all too clear.
Figure 3.2: A season of growth
Mobile users and fixed lines in Africa (millions), and change in effective teledensity by year, 1993-2003
Source: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database.
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Revolutionary growth
As shown in Table 3.1, the average level of growth in effective teledensity in Africa over the last 
decade has been 15.5% per year. But this average hides a very different performance in the second 
half of the period from the ﬁrst half. Since 1998, the growth rate in effective teledensity has been 
24.6% per year, which is more than four times higher than for any comparable period in the past 
(see Figure 3.4, below, left chart). This step change is conﬁrmed by the impact on annual change 
in effective teledensity (see Figure 3.2, above, right chart). In the 1990s, effective teledensity was 
typically rising by a few tenths of a percentage point at most; but since the late 1990s, effective 
teledensity has been rising by more than one percentage point per year.
Elsewhere in the world, notably in developed regions, the impact of mobile communications has 
generally been incremental and complementary to the existing ﬁxed-line networks. But in Africa, 
the impact of mobile communications has been little short of revolutionary. The period since the late 
1990s has been qualitatively different, in ICT terms, than anything that had gone before, especially 
for individual African economies, like Democratic Republic of Congo,2 Mauritania or Uganda.
Within the continent of Africa, DR Congo and Guinea were the ﬁrst economies where the number of 
mobile telephone users overtook the number of ﬁxed lines, as long ago as 1998, followed by Côte 
dʼIvoire in 1999. By 2000, some 21 African economies had made it to the cross-over point, including 
South Africa and Morocco. In 2001, the African continent as a whole became the ﬁrst world region 
to make the cross-over. By the start of 2004, mobile telephone users exceeded ﬁxed lines by more 
than 99 times in the extreme case of DR Congo, but the gap is at least eight-fold in ﬁve African 
economies (Cameroon, Congo, DR Congo, Mauritania and Uganda). Africa, as a whole, had 52 
million mobile telephone users at the end of 2003 compared with just 25 million ﬁxed lines. 
The gap between the ﬁxed and mobile penetration is set to grow even wider in the coming years. 
In 2003, growth in the mobile market amounted to 38%, or almost 15 million new users, compared 
to just 8%, or two  million new subscribers, in the ﬁxed-line market. The ratios between mobile and 
ﬁxed lines that currently prevail in countries like Morocco or South Africa will soon be the norm for 
the rest of the continent. 
For many young Africans, their ﬁrst experience of ICTs will be in using a mobile telephone. But is 
there a danger that this will be their only experience? The popularity of mobiles in Africa may be 
to the detriment of growth in the ﬁxed-line Internet. Africaʼs share of global Internet users (1.8%) 
is far below its share of global mobile telephone users (3.8%) and mobile telephones outnumber 
personal computers by ﬁve to one. At some stage in the future, the mobile telephone network (or 
more accurately, wireless technologies in general)3 will provide a viable solution for low-cost, high-
speed access to the Internet, but this is not likely to happen within the next ﬁve years. Thus take-up 
of Internet in Africa may be constrained by the lack of growth in the ﬁxed-line network.
Digital divide or digital opportunities?
Is the digital divide a useful analytical construct for understanding the changes taking place in 
African society? The theory underpinning the digital divide is that differences in access to ICTs are 
determined by long-term structural factors, such as wealth or level of education, that tend to be 
2  DR Congo.
3  See an extended discussion on this topic in ITU (2004), The portable Internet, 6th edition in the ITU Internet Reports series, 
September 2004, 220 pp.
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relatively stable over long time periods, or may even increase. To summarise, the “poor stay poor 
while the rich stay rich”, under a digital divide model.
The digital divide theory is similar to that of a class-based society, in which there is little social 
mobility. If the digital divide theory were a useful analytical tool for Africa, then the ranking among 
countries within the continent, as measured by effective teledensity, should remain relatively stable 
over time. By analysing changes in the rankings of economies over time, it is possible to “test” the 
validity of the digital divide hypothesis. 
One could make a reasonable case for stability in rankings during the period from 1993-98, but 
the digital divide is not at all useful in explaining changes in the period since 1998. The digital 
divide may hold true for the four economies that top the chart (Réunion, Seychelles, Mauritius and 
South Africa), which were ranked the same in both 1993 and 2003, but further down the ladder, the 
hypothesis breaks down. Rather than a class-based society, the actual picture is one of intense 
social mobility. Apart from the top four, hardly any other country stays in the same place in the 
rankings. 
One method of measuring the stability over time, or lack of it, in a dataset is to use the “Spearmanʼs 
Rank” test of the correlation coefﬁcient.4 In this particular case, we are not measuring correlation 
(each economy stays the same throughout the period!) but rather the degree of stability. Spearmanʼs 
Rank works by measuring the squares of the differences in rank in the dataset. Between 1993 and 
1998, the sum of the squares of the differences in ranks (∑d2) amounted to 894, giving an R2 of 
0.968 (where 1 is perfect correlation, or in this case stability). But between 1998 and 2003, the ∑d2 
is almost four times higher at 3 444, producing a much lower R2 of 0.876.
The implication of this is that there has been a step change in the performance of the African ICT 
market, starting from the late 1990s. Although the prime explanatory variable in this change is the 
rise of mobile communications, this phenomenon is actually coincident with a number of other 
policy changes, notably increasing market liberalisation (see Figure 3.4, below, right hand chart), 
the development of pre-paid billing as the dominant business model, the creation of independent 
telecommunication regulatory authorities and an increase in within-region investment. These 
changes have been mutually reinforcing.
The digital divide hypothesis is no longer an accurate predictor of what is happening in the African 
ICT market. A more accurate description might be “digital opportunities”, in that individual nations 
have shown much greater “mobility” in moving up or down the rankings, as measured by effective 
teledensity. The “starting position” of a particular economy is no longer an especially good predictor 
of where the “future position” will be. Consider the following examples:
4  For a description of Spearmanʼs Rank, see www.geographyﬁeldwork.com/SpearmansRank.htm.
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  Rank 1993
 1 Reunion
 2 Seychelles
 3 Mauritius
 4 South Africa
 5 Tunisia
 6 Libya
 7 Namibia
 8 Cape  Verde
 9 Algeria
 10 Egypt
 11 Mayotte
 12 Morocco
 13 Botswana
 14 Gabon
 15 Sao Tomé e Principe
 16 Swaziland
 17 Gambia
 18 Djibouti
 19 Zimbabwe
 20 Zambia
 21 Kenya
 22 Senegal
 23 Congo
 24 Lesotho
 25 Comoros
 26 Cote dʼIvoire
 27 Guinea-Bissau
 28 Angola
 29 Cameroon
 30 Togo
 31 Benin
 32 Eritrea
 33 Mozambique
 34 Malawi
 35 Mauritania
 36 Equatorial Guinea
 37 Nigeria
 38 Sierra Leone
 39 Tanzania
 40 Ghana
 41 Madagascar
 42 Burundi
 43 Sudan
 44 Ethiopia
 45 Burkina Faso
 46 Central African Rep.
 47 Rwanda
 48 Guinea
 49 Liberia
 50 Somalia
 51 Mali
 52 Niger
 53 Uganda
 54 Congo (DR)
 55 Chad
1998
Reunion
Seychelles
 Mauritius
 South Africa
Cape  Verde
Libya
Mayotte
Tunisia
Botswana
Egypt
Namibia
Morocco
 Algeria
 Gabon
Swaziland
 Sao Tomé e Principe
 Gambia
Zimbabwe
Senegal
 Djibouti
 Equatorial Guinea
Cote dʼIvoire
Kenya
Lesotho
 Comoros
 Zambia
Congo
 Togo
Guinea-Bissau
Ghana
Eritrea
 Cameroon
 Benin
Mauritania
Sudan
 Angola
 Mozambique
Nigeria
Tanzania
Burkina Faso
 Malawi
Sierra Leone
 Madagascar
 Guinea
Mali
Burundi
 Ethiopia
 Central African Rep.
Uganda
Liberia
Somalia
Niger
 Rwanda
Chad
Congo (DR)
2003 Rank
Reunion  1
Seychelles 2
Mauritius 3
South Africa 4
Botswana 5
Morocco 6
Gabon 7
Mayotte 8
Tunisia 9
Cape Verde 10
Libya 11
Egypt 12
Gambia 13
Namibia 14
Mauritania15
Congo 16
Swaziland 17
Equatorial Guinea 18
Cote dʼIvoire 19
Lesotho 20
Algeria 21
Cameroon 22
Senegal 23
Kenya 24
Sao Tomé e Principe 25
Togo 26
Ghana 27
Djibouti 28
Benin 29
Zimbabwe 30
Sierra Leone31
Uganda 32
Sudan 33
Nigeria 34
Tanzania 35
Mali 36
Mozambique 37
Zambia 38
Congo (DR) 39
Burkina Faso 40
Madagascar 41
Comoros 42
Rwanda 43
Guinea 44
Angola 45
Malawi 46
Central African Rep. 47
Eritrea 48
Burundi 49
Guinea-Bissau 50
Chad 51
Ethiopia 52
Somalia 53
Liberia 54
Niger 55
Figure 3.3: Change in ranks, African economies, effective teledensity, 1993, 1998 and 2003
Source: ITU analysis, based on data from ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database.
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• Mauritania, which began in 35th position in 1993 (see Table 3.1, above), had improved 
its position slightly by 1998, but then made substantial progress after the introduction of 
competitive mobile communications in 2000, rising to 15th position by 2003.
• The Democratic Republic of Congo began in 54th position and fell further to bottom place 
in 1998, but thereafter rose to 39th position by the end of the period. Political change in the 
economy, and the coming of peace, is part of the reason for this improved performance. 
But equally the fact that DR Congo had adopted a relatively liberal stance in comparison 
with some of its neighbours in opening up the mobile market to competition is also part 
of the reason for its success, particularly compared with near neighbours like Ethiopia 
that did not permit competition (see Figure 3.5, below, left chart). With one possible 
exception (Djibouti) it seems to be the case that those countries that have grown their 
mobile networks fastest since 2000 are the ones that permitted competition; and the more 
operators in the market, the faster the growth.
• All five North African economies saw their positions deteriorate, with the exception of 
Morocco, whose position improved from 12th to 6th. What explains Moroccan success? A 
key factor has been liberalisation of the Moroccan market through a licensing procedure 
(auction) that produced high revenues for the government, but an urgent imperative for 
the operators to generate revenue by rolling out their networks as quickly as possible.
Figure 3.4: Step change
Changes in growth rates of effective teledensity, 1978-2003, and mobile market, 1993-2004, in Africa
Source: ITU World Telecommunication Database (left chart), and ITU “African Telecommunication 
Indicators, 2004” (right chart).
Figure 3.5: How many operators?
Mobile user density in the DR Congo and Ethiopia, 1999-2003 (left chart), and Africa’s fastest growing networks, 
2000-03 (right chart)
Source: ITU “African Telecommunication Indicators, 2004”, Geneva (May 2004).
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• Countries with a more liberal market generally saw their positions improve, for instance 
Ghana, which went up from 40th to 27th, or Uganda, which rose from 53rd to 32nd. Other 
economies that retained monopolies have generally seen their positions deteriorate, such 
as Comoros, which fell by 17 places, or Ethiopia, which fell by eight places. However, 
there are also counter examples. Equatorial Guinea has increased its ranking by 18 
places despite retaining a monopoly; but here the influence of oil money and increased 
foreign investment might explain some of the change in status. According to data from 
UNCTAD (2004: 436), Equatorial Guinea stands second only to Morocco among African 
economies in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) totalling some US$ 1.4 billion in 
2003.
Overall, the position is one of increased dynamism, in which all economies have beneﬁted (even 
the slowest-growing ICT economy in Africa – Liberia – increased its effective teledensity by almost 
one-third during the last decade) and in which almost half of the economies have sustained an 
annual growth rate of over 20% during the full decade, meaning that their effective number of users 
has grown at least six-fold over ten years.
Conclusion
There is an old saying, that a glass can be described as half-empty or half-full. Both descriptions 
may be statistically accurate, and fully supported by scientiﬁc observation, but the former is 
backwards-looking and pessimistic while the other is forwards-looking and optimistic. The same is 
true of the phrases “digital divide” and “digital opportunity”. The former is accurate, and it is possible 
to show the persistence of incontrovertible differences in level of access to ICTs, both within Africa 
and between Africa and the rest of the world. But the latter is more likely to attract the investors, 
and is more in tune with what is currently happening in the region.
To quote from Benjamin Compaine (2001): “My policy recommendation: declare the war against the 
digital divide won and move on to issues with higher stakes”. Although this was written in a different 
context, it seems to apply very well to Africa. If we choose to focus only on Africaʼs problems, we 
do a signiﬁcant disservice to the men and women who have been busy creating a revolution in the 
ﬁeld of ICTs in the last few years. Let us rather focus on Africaʼs potential, and let us welcome Africa 
as the newest member of the global information society.
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